Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 12, 2025

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 12, 2025

Grace Mappes, Daria Novikov, Olivia Gibson, Angelica Evans, Davit Gasparyan, and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate Trotter

April 12, 2025, 6:00 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on April 12. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 13 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg expressed support on April 11 for the deployment of an allied "reassurance force" in rear areas of western Ukraine after a possible future ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia.[1] The Times reported on April 11 that Kellogg expressed support for a "partition" of Ukraine between European, Ukrainian, and Russian forces; the deployment of a European "reassurance force" in western Ukraine; and establishing an 18-mile-wide "demilitarized zone" along the current frontline.[2] Kellogg clarified later on April 11 that he supports the presence of a "reassurance force" that does not include US troops to support Ukrainian sovereignty, but that none of his statements during the interview suggested "a partitioning of Ukraine."[3] Kellogg noted that the Times misrepresented some of his statements referencing possible areas of responsibility (AORs) of a future European "reassurance force."

Kellogg's clarification regarding the deployment of a "reassurance force" in Ukraine's rear areas is consistent with several statements from Ukrainian and European leaders about a possible future peacekeeping contingent deployed to Ukraine. Ukrainian Commander in Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on April 9 that a putative peacekeeping contingent would not deploy to the frontline.[4] European Commission Vice President Kaja Kallas stated on April 10 that a future peacekeeping contingent would be likely to deploy not to the frontline but rather deeper within Ukraine or even outside of Ukraine.[5] Bloomberg reported on April 10 that UK Defense Secretary John Healey and French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu stated that the Coalition of the Willing aims to develop more detailed plans within the next two weeks about how the coalition will help secure Ukrainian airspace, coastline, and land.[6] People familiar with the matter told Bloomberg that the coalition hopes that the United States will agree to "backstop" any future European deployments to Ukraine with air power, border surveillance, and intelligence.

Russian state-owned and pro-Kremlin media amplified a Russian official's blanket rejection of any peacekeeping force in Ukraine on April 12. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Ambassador-at-Large Rodion Miroshnik responded to Kellogg's statements on April 12 and reiterated the Kremlin's objection to the presence of any peacekeeping contingent in Ukraine following a possible future ceasefire or peace agreement because a peacekeeping force would preserve the "level of toxicity" that supposedly prompted Russia to launch its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[7] Russian state-owned and pro-state media widely amplified Miroshnik's statement.[8] Kremlin officials have repeatedly rejected the idea of a possible future peacekeeping force in Ukraine or any European involvement in post-war Ukraine.[9] Miroshnik's accusation of "toxicity" in Ukraine is an indirect reference to the Kremlin's continued demands that any conclusion to the war in Ukraine must address Russia's so-called "root causes" of the war. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov previously defined Russia's perceived "root causes" of the war as NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and the Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[10] Russian officials frequently directly invoke these "root causes" to justify Russia's continued war effort and pre-war demands amounting to total Ukrainian capitulation, and Miroshnik's April 12 statement is an indirect restatement of this concept.[11]

Russian forces have resumed a more typical strike pattern in late March and early April 2025 after a temporary spike in the size of Russian long-range strike packages in mid-February and early March 2025. Russian forces conducted notably larger strike packages in mid-February and early March 2025 but have launched strike packages more comparable to trends last observed in January and early February 2025, albeit using fewer missiles, in recent weeks. Russian forces notably conducted no strikes against Ukraine on April 7 - the day after conducting their largest strike in over a month on April 6 — but have since resumed daily strikes.[12] Russian officials have thus far refused to engage with or have outright rejected the US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire that US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff presumably proposed to Russian President Vladimir Putin during a meeting on March 13.[13] The proposed long-range strikes ceasefire on energy infrastructure would not require Russia to cease all long-range drone and missile strikes, but the proposed general ceasefire along the current frontline and in the air and sea would likely require Russia to end all strikes on Ukraine. Russian forces are likely delaying negotiations on a general ceasefire in order to continue making gains along the frontline in Ukraine and continue devastating long-range strikes against Ukrainian defense industrial and civilian areas in order to intimidate civilians and undermine Ukraine's ability to defend itself against future Russian aggression.

Russian forces have reportedly adjusted their long-range strike tactics in recent weeks, likely as part of an effort to inflict significant damage with strike packages of sizes similar to those they had been using earlier in the year and to intimidate Ukrainian civilians. Ukrainian sources and German outlet BILD reported in late March and early April 2025 that Russian forces are loitering long-range drones at high altitudes several kilometers from large Ukrainian cities and other targets before conducting synchronized strikes with multiple drones.[14] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces are flying Shahed drones in the densest possible formations in order to overwhelm Ukrainian air defense systems and that Russian forces concentrate a group of 10 to 15 Shahed drones outside of a city before striking the city. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported on April 6 that Russian forces are constantly modernizing their Shahed drones, ballistic missiles, and strike tactics, complicating Ukrainian forces' ability to shoot them down.[15] Russian forces previously launched Shahed long-range drones in a series of waves against various targets each night, and this reported effort to operate drones in denser formations suggests that Russian forces believe this new tactic will overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses more effectively.

People's Republic of China (PRC) military officials reportedly visited the frontline in Ukraine to glean insights for future warfare amid reports that at least 155 Chinese nationals are fighting in Ukraine. An unnamed former Western intelligence official told Reuters in an article published on April 11 that the PRC authorized an unspecified number of PRC military officers to visit the frontline in Ukraine alongside the Russian military to gain tactical insights from the war in Ukraine but did not specify when these visits may have occurred.[16] ISW cannot independently verify this report. Two unnamed US officials familiar with US intelligence and the former Western intelligence official told Reuters that roughly 100 to 200 Chinese nationals are fighting for the Russian military as "mercenaries" independent from the Chinese government. The sources further noted that the Chinese fighters appear to have minimal training and are not having any discernable impact on Russian military operations. ISW has observed reports that these Chinese nationals likely signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) of their own accord rather than at the direction of PRC officials.[17] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently reported that Ukrainian intelligence discovered that at least 155 Chinese nationals were fighting for the Russian military in Ukraine.[18] PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Lin Jian recently stated that the PRC MFA is unaware of the more than 155 Chinese nationals fighting in Ukraine, however.[19] The Guardian recently reported that Russian entities are actively operating recruitment campaigns across several Chinese social media networks, further suggesting that the PRC government may be aware of Russian military recruitment efforts targeting Chinese citizens and may be disinterested in combating these efforts.[20]

Ukraine’s European partners announced additional military aid packages within the context of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format) meeting on April 11. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced on April 11 that Norway will provide 100 million euros (roughly $113 million) of financing for the United Kingdom’s (UK) 450-million-pound (roughly $588 million) drone and repair aid package to Ukraine.[21] The Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) announced on April 3 that it will provide Ukraine with an additional military aid package worth 6.7 billion Danish kroner (over $1 billion) between 2025 and 2027.[22] The Danish aid package will provide Ukraine with air defense, artillery systems, and ammunition, support the drone and information technology (IT) coalitions, and support the development of a financial framework for Ukraine’s Air Force.[23] Norwegian Defense Minister Tore Sandvik stated that Norway will allocate an additional 10 billion Norwegian kroner (roughly $938 million) for joint Norwegian-Baltic training and provisioning of a new Ukrainian brigade.[24]

 Key Takeaways:

• US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg expressed support on April 11 for the deployment of an allied "reassurance force" in the rear areas of western Ukraine after a possible future ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia.
• Russian state-owned and pro-Kremlin media amplified a Russian official's blanket rejection of any peacekeeping force in Ukraine on April 12.
• Russian forces have resumed a more typical strike pattern in late March and early April 2025 after a temporary spike in the size of Russian long-range strike packages in mid-February and early March 2025.
• People's Republic of China (PRC) military officials reportedly visited the frontline in Ukraine to glean insights for future warfare amid reports that at least 155 Chinese nationals are fighting in Ukraine.
• Ukraine’s European partners announced additional military aid packages within the context of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format) meeting on April 11.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kurakhove, and Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Alleged Ceasefire Violation
• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Alleged Ceasefire Violations

Ukraine and Russia have not yet concluded a maritime ceasefire agreement due to ongoing Russian demands for Western sanctions relief. Negotiations regarding the conditions of the ceasefire on strikes against energy infrastructure are ongoing, and the resolution of these negotiations remains unclear.

The Russian MoD claimed on April 12, without evidence, that Ukrainian forces struck five energy infrastructure facilities in Krasnodar Krai, Kursk Oblast, and occupied Zaporizhia Oblast in the past day.[25]

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued fighting in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on April 12 but did not make confirmed advances.

Russian sources claimed that fighting continued northwest of Belgorod City near Demidovka and Popovka.[26]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Popovka.[27]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 11 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced west of Zhuravka (north of Sumy City near the international border).[28]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on April 12 that Russian forces advanced in northern and eastern Loknya (southeast of Zhuravka).[29]

An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Sumy direction reported on April 12 that small Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups continue efforts to identify weak points in Ukrainian defensive lines in the Sumy Oblast border area but that Ukrainian forces repel the Russian groups.[30] The Ukrainian officer stated that Russian forces lack the manpower to conduct an offensive operation to seize Sumy City.

Order of Battle: Rosgvardia Spetsnaz drone operators reportedly continue operating in Sumy Oblast.[31]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian and Ukrainian sources did not report ground attacks in northern Kharkiv Oblast on April 12.

Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on April 12 that Russian forces in the Kharkiv direction are attempting to replenish units following high losses and preparing to resume offensive operations.[32] A servicemember in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction reported on April 12 that Russian forces occasionally conduct reconnaissance missions with small infantry groups during assaults but do not use armored vehicles due to robust Ukrainian artillery and drone capabilities in the area.[33]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on April 12 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued offensive operations near the international border northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka and north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka, Holubivka, and Zapadne on April 11 and 12.[34]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on April 12 that Russian forces are attacking Ukrainian positions using small cars, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and motorcycles and that Russian forces have not used heavy equipment in the brigade’s area of responsibility for “quite some time.”[35]

Order of Battle: Drone elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[36]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on April 12 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger reiterated claims on April 12 that Russian forces seized Nadiya (east of Borova).[37]

Russian forces conducted ground attacks northeast of Borova near Zahryzove, Lozova, and Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Nadiya; and southeast of Borova near Tverdokhlibove, Novoyehorivka, Hrekivka, and Olhivka on April 11 and 12.[38] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on April 12 that Ukrainian forces recently repelled a Russian reinforced platoon-size mechanized assault consisting of five vehicles near Lozova and Nova Kruhlyakivka.[39]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on April 12 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 12 that Russian forces reached the southern border of Novomykhailivka and the eastern border of Ridkodub (both northeast of Lyman).[40]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Lyman towards Hlushchenkove and near Novomykhailivka, Katerynivka, Nove, Ridkodub, Zelena Dolyna, Kolodyazi, and Yampolivka, east of Lyman near Torske, and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area on April 11 and 12.[41]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on April 11 that Russian forces leverage poor weather conditions to attack using small infantry groups.[42]

Order of Battle: Elements of Russian “Storm V” penal recruit units are reportedly operating in the north of Torske (east of Lyman).[43]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on April 12 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on April 11 and 12.[44]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on April 12 but did not make confirmed advances.

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself, northeast of Chasiv Yar near Orikhovo-Vasylivka, southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka, and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and toward Predtechyne and Bila Hora on April 11 and 12.[45] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces published footage on April 12 showing Ukrainian forces repelling a Russian reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault near Klishchiivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar).[46] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed three Russian armored vehicles and damaged two tanks involved in the assault.

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Druzhba (northeast of Toretsk) during a platoon-sized mechanized assault.[47] Additional geolocated footage published on April 12 and between March 24 and 8 indicates that Russian forces advanced in the northeastern outskirts of Toretsk, to central Krymske (northwest of Toretsk), and within central Novospaske (west of Toretsk, formerly Petrivka).[48]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces reached Nelipivka (northeast of Toretsk), advanced west of Panteleymonivka (southwest of Toretsk), and cleared the Toretska mine in northern Toretsk.[49]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself, northwest of Toretsk near Ivanopillya, north of Toretsk near Dachne and Dyliivka, east of Toretsk near Druzhba, and southwest of Toretsk near Oleksandropil and Valentynivka on April 11 and 12.[50]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating near Kostyantynivka.[51] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Dyliivka (north of Toretsk).[52] Elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are reportedly operating in the direction of Ivanopillya and Kostyantynivka.[53]

Russian forces recently advanced east and southwest of Pokrovsk.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into western Kalynove (east of Pokrovsk) and likely seized the settlement, advanced north of Novotoretske (east of Pokrovsk), and marginally advanced in eastern Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[54] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Kalynove, and a Russian milblogger credited elements of the Russian 8th CAA with seizing Kalynove — likely referring to elements of the 8th CAA's 20th Motorized Rifle Division operating in the area.[55]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Pokrovsk near Kalynove and Tarasivka, east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka, southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka, south of Pokrovsk near Pishchane, and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne and Udachne on April 11 and 12.[56] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces periodically counterattack south and immediately southwest of Pokrovsk.[57]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone unit operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on April 12 that Ukrainian forces have observed Russian commanders sending injured Russian troops to conduct assaults in the area.[58]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division, including its 255th and 33rd motorized rifle regiments, are reportedly operating near Pokrovsk and Tarasivka.[59]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on April 12 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Uspenivka; east of Novopavlivka near Nadiivka, Kotlyarivka, Preobrazhenka, Sribne, and Troitske; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Bohdanivka on April 11 and 12.[60]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 11 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Kostyantynopil (west of Kurakhove).[61]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 12 that Russian forces made significant advances south of Bahatyr and Odradne and north of Rozdolne (all southwest of Kurakhove).[62]

Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Andriivka, Kostyantynopil, and Bahatyr and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv, Odradne, and Rozdolne on April 11 and 12.[63]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Bahatyr.[64]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on April 12 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed on April 12 that Russian forces advanced near Shevchenko (west of Velyka Novosilka).[65]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Burlatske; west of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole, Pryvilne, and Shevchenko; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka on April 11 and 12.[66]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 16th Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Protection Brigade (Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[67]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest of Robotyne near Shcherbaky, Mali Shcherbaky, Lobkove, and Kamyanske on April 11 and 12 but did not advance.[68]

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Dnipro (Kherson) direction on April 12 but did not advance.[69]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River.[70]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 88 Shahed and decoy drones against Ukraine from Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Kursk City.[71] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 56 Shahed and other drones over Ukraine and that 24 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that strikes damaged infrastructure in Kharkiv, Kyiv, Odesa, Kirovohrad, Dnipropetrovsk, and Donetsk oblasts.[72]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

ISW is suspending Russian mobilization and force generation coverage in its daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments. ISW will be introducing a new product line tracking Russian mobilization and force generation efforts in the coming days.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is suspending occupation coverage in its daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments. ISW is introducing a new product line tracking activities in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine. The occupation updates will examine Russian efforts to consolidate administrative control of annexed areas and forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems. Click here to read the Russian Occupation Update.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://x.com/generalkellogg/status/1910811346251268305

[2] https://www.thetimes.com/us/american-politics/article/keith-kellogg-general-ukraine-envoy-trump-ldjprpzxt?utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Twitter#Echobox=1744400108-2

[3] https://x.com/generalkellogg/status/1910811346251268305

[4] https://lb dot ua/society/2025/04/09/670107_oleksandr_sirskiy_pidgotovleniy.html

[5] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/04/10/ukraine-russia-force-coalition-britain-france-nato/f4b8693e-15d5-11f0-8c4c-4878d48028c1_story.html

[6] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-04-10/uk-and-france-to-accelerate-military-planning-for-ukraine-force

[7] https://t.me/tass_agency/310276 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/23666505; https://russian.rt dot com/ussr/news/1463154-miroshnik-kellog-razdel-ukraina; https://www.kp dot ru/online/news/6325163/; https://news dot ru/europe/v-mid-rossii-otvetili-na-ideyu-kelloga-razdelit-ukrainu-na-zony-kontrolya/; https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/news/2025/04/12/1103972-miroshnik-zayavil; https://ura dot news/news/1052916322; https://rg dot ru/2025/04/12/miroshnik-ocenil-ideiu-o-razdele-ukrainy-mezhdu-evropoj-i-rossiej.html

[8] https://t.me/tass_agency/310276 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/23666505; https://russian.rt dot com/ussr/news/1463154-miroshnik-kellog-razdel-ukraina; https://www.kp dot ru/online/news/6325163/; https://news dot ru/europe/v-mid-rossii-otvetili-na-ideyu-kelloga-razdelit-ukrainu-na-zony-kontrolya/; https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/news/2025/04/12/1103972-miroshnik-zayavil; https://ura dot news/news/1052916322; https://rg dot ru/2025/04/12/miroshnik-ocenil-ideiu-o-razdele-ukrainy-mezhdu-evropoj-i-rossiej.html

[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030725

[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021825; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-30-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-12-2025

[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021825; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-30-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-12-2025

[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar040725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040625; https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/trump-angry-putin-zelenskyy-iran-sanctions-rcna198729

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041025

[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar040825 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-8-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2025

[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2025

[16] https://www.reuters.com/world/chinese-nationals-fighting-russia-ukraine-are-mercenaries-us-officials-2025-04-11/ ; https://archive.ph/NLRNj

[17] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-11-2025

[18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041025

[19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10-2025

[20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10-2025

[21] https://www.facebook.com/rustemumerov.ua/posts/pfbid02KjdxQQKZdEnCkFvzvCi4Eo9cMe5uYA4TBESpuvyqCYQrBsVa9tEQrqxKPBcFHc3pl; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/11/rustem-umyerov-rozpoviv-pro-pidsumky-ramshtajnu/; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-04-10/uk-funds-military-drones-for-ukraine-amid-ceasefire-push

[22] https://www.fmn dot dk/da/nyheder/2025/donationspakke-xxv-militar-stotte-til-ukraine-for-67-mia.-kroner/

[23] https://www.fmn dot dk/da/nyheder/2025/coalition-of-the-willing-forsvarsminister-troels-lund-poulsen-diskuterer-stotten-til-ukraine-med-allierede/; https://www.fmn dot dk/da/nyheder/2025/donationspakke-xxv-militar-stotte-til-ukraine-for-67-mia.-kroner/

[24] https://www.regjeringen dot no/en/aktuelt/norway-will-contribute-ten-billion-norwegian-kroner-to-equipping-and-training-a-ukrainian-brigade/id3097272/; https://suspilne dot media/993369-norvegia-vidilit-830-mln-evro-na-pidgotovku-ta-osnasenna-brigadi-zsu/

[25] https://t.me/mod_russia/51211

[26] https://t.me/wargonzo/25872; https://t.me/dva_majors/68906

[27] https://t.me/zogrussia1/982

[28] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/27236; https://t.me/OMBr67/2578

[29] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31310 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/161062

[30] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/04/12/vorog-nevelychkymy-grupamy-shukaye-slabki-misczya-na-kordoni-u-sumskij-oblasti-voyin-syl-oborony/

[31] https://t.me/RosgvardOfficial/9479 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/18181

[32] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7869

[33] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/12/siru-zonu-peretvoryly-u-kill-zonu-bankir-rozpoviv-yak-syly-oborony-nyshhat-vorozhu-pihotu/

[34] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7869; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23017; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23020; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23045

[35] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/12/lyshyty-voroga-bez-kvadroczykliv-rechnyczya-pro-vtraty-rosiyan-na-kupyanskomu-napryamku/

[36] https://t.me/dva_majors/68945

[37] https://t.me/yurasumy/22362; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10-2025

[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23020; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23045; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23017; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7869

[39] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7869

[40] https://t.me/yurasumy/22362

[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23045; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23020; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23017; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7869; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63469

[42] https://t.me/ombr66/1650 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1910773055926022321

[43] https://t.me/botsman_morgan/4649

[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23020; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23017; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7869

[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23045; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23020; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23017; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7869

[46] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7885

[47] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8874; https://t.me/ombr_28/2019; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1911032252923850987

[48] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8875; https://t.me/ombr_28/2019; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/27264; https://t.me/azov_media/6732 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1911053080742789333; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1911053296594215413; https://x.com/Veteransforukr1/status/1904216468989882561; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1911053700325326903; https://x.com/Veteransforukr1/status/1907919274074845369; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1911054038856073491; https://x.com/Veteransforukr1/status/1909632325568414142

[49] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89810; https://t.me/dva_majors/68906; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26845; https://t.me/yurasumy/22361; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63459 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31296

[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23045; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23020; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23017; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7869; https://t.me/dva_majors/68906

[51] https://t.me/sashakots/53016; https://t.me/basurin_e/18180

[52] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13678

[53] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63459

[54] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8873; https://t.me/osirskiy/1125; https://x.com/blinzka/status/1910994223307817166 ; https://x.com/Map_Hargoo/status/1911094573629161612; https://t.me/spartan_ngu/2349 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8876; https://t.me/SHTORM242/238

[55] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89801 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89810 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31306 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22360

[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23045 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23020 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23017 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7869

[57] https://t.me/yurasumy/22359

[58] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZZ3Cphup-rQ ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/12/kalich-polky-v-diyi-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-vorog-vidpravlyaye-na-shturm-okupantiv-na-mylyczyah-voyin-zsu/

[59] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89827 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/68895 ;

[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23045 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23020 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23017 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7869 ; https://t.me/rybar/69587 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22356

[61] https://x.com/Map_Hargoo/status/1911022320769966313; https://t.me/voin_dv/14372

[62] https://t.me/yurasumy/22355

[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23045 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23020 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23017 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7869 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89833

[64] https://t.me/voin_dv/14384

[65] https://t.me/rybar/69587 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/310263

[66] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23020 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02XCHnibzqqtDna1oah5t7wxLyHA9U4xfMbB2L8BVYEjo23HXqhP2h9ZM5fes6cK6zl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23017

[67] https://t.me/dva_majors/68899

[68] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23020 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02XCHnibzqqtDna1oah5t7wxLyHA9U4xfMbB2L8BVYEjo23HXqhP2h9ZM5fes6cK6zl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23017; https://t.me/wargonzo/25872; https://t.me/dva_majors/68906

[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23045; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23020 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02XCHnibzqqtDna1oah5t7wxLyHA9U4xfMbB2L8BVYEjo23HXqhP2h9ZM5fes6cK6zl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23017

[70] https://t.me/dva_majors/68914

[71] https://t.me/kpszsu/32375

[72] https://t.me/kpszsu/32375; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-launches-scores-drones-ukraine-four-people-injured-kyiv-says-2025-04-12/